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Bell inequalities play a central roˆle in the study of quantum non-locality and entanglement, with
many applications in quantum information. Despite the huge literature on Bell inequalities, it is not
easy to find a clear conceptual answer to what a Bell inequality is, or a clear guiding principle as to
how they may be derived. In this paper, we introduce a notion of logical Bell inequality which
can be used to systematically derive testable inequalities for a very wide variety of situations. There
is a single clear conceptual principle, based on purely logical consistency conditions, which underlies
our notion of logical Bell inequalities. We show that in a precise sense, all Bell inequalities can be
taken to be of this form. Our approach is very general. It applies directly to any family of sets of
commuting observables. Thus it covers not only the n-partite scenarios to which Bell inequalities
are standardly applied, but also Kochen-Specker configurations, and many other examples. There
is much current work on experimental tests for contextuality. Our approach directly yields, in a
systematic fashion, testable inequalities for a very general notion of contextuality.
There has been much work on obtaining proofs of Bell’s theorem ‘without inequalities’ or ‘without
probabilities’. These proofs are seen as being in a sense more definitive and logically robust than
the inequality-based proofs. On the hand, they lack the fault-tolerant aspect of inequalities. Our
approach reconciles these aspects, and in fact shows how the logical robustness can be converted into
systematic, general derivations of inequalities with provable violations. Moreover, the kind of strong
non-locality or contextuality exhibited by the GHZ argument or by Kochen-Specker configurations
can be shown to lead to maximal violations of the corresponding logical Bell inequalities. Thus
the qualitative and the quantitative aspects are combined harmoniously.
PACS numbers: 03.65.Ud
I. INTRODUCTION
There is a huge literature on Bell inequalities [1, 2],
with many ingenious derivations of families of inequali-
ties. However, a unifying principle with a clear concep-
tual basis has proved elusive. In this paper, we introduce
a form of Bell inequality based on logical consistency con-
ditions, which we call logical Bell inequalities. This
approach is both conceptually illuminating and techni-
cally powerful.
To get some feeling for the results, we shall firstly dis-
cuss how Bell inequalities are used. Their main applica-
tion, of course, is to show the non-locality of quantum
mechanics, as famously first demonstrated in Bell’s theo-
rem [1]. More broadly, Bell inequalities are used to delin-
eate those situations which can be accounted for by clas-
sical physical concepts from those which are inherently
non-classical; and the content of Bell’s theorem is exactly
that quantum mechanics produces empirically accessible
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phenomena which fall into the latter category.
An important feature of the inequalities is that they
have a fault-tolerant aspect which makes them very
suitable for experimental verification. Violation of a
Bell inequality is quantitative, and allows non-classicality
to be demonstrated without relying on idealized perfect
measurements or state preparations.
There are also many applications of Bell inequalities
in quantum information, for example in quantum key
distribution [3–5], quantum communication complexity
[6] and detection of quantum entanglement [7], so that
they also play a leading roˆle in more applied work.
Although a huge literature on Bell inequalities has ap-
peared over the past few decades, it is not easy to distill
from this literature a clear conceptual answer to what a
Bell inequality is, or a clear guiding principle as to how
they may be derived.
The present paper addresses this point, and introduces
a notion of logical Bell inequality which can be used to
systematically derive testable inequalities for a very wide
variety of situations. The following points in particular
are worth emphasizing:
• There is a single clear conceptual principle, based
on purely logical consistency conditions, which un-
derlies our notion of logical Bell inequalities. We
show that in a precise sense, all Bell inequalities
can be taken to be of this form.
2• Our approach is very general — much more so than
the great majority of the literature on Bell inequali-
ties. It applies directly to any family of sets of com-
muting observables. Thus it covers not only the n-
partite scenarios to which Bell inequalities are stan-
dardly applied, but also Kochen-Specker configura-
tions, and many other examples. This is important
since there is much current work on experimental
tests for contextuality, e.g. [8, 9], a broader phe-
nomenon than non-locality. Our approach directly
yields, in a systematic fashion, testable inequalities
for a very general notion of contextuality.
• There has been much work on obtaining proofs
of Bell’s theorem ‘without inequalities’ or ‘with-
out probabilities’ [10–12]. These proofs are seen
as being in a sense more definitive and logically
robust than the inequality-based proofs. On the
hand, they lack the fault-tolerant aspect of inequal-
ities. Our approach fully reconciles these aspects,
and in fact shows how the logical robustness can be
converted into systematic, general derivations of in-
equalities with provable violations. Moreover, the
kind of strong non-locality or contextuality exhib-
ited by the GHZ argument or by Kochen-Specker
configurations can be shown to lead to maximal
violations of the corresponding logical Bell in-
equalities. Thus the qualitative and the quanti-
tative aspects are combined harmoniously.
We now turn to a more precise, technical summary of
our results.
We show that a rational inequality is satisfied by all
non-contextual models if and only if it is equivalent to a
logical Bell inequality. Thus quantitative tests for con-
textuality or non-locality always hinge on purely logical
consistency conditions. We obtain explicit descriptions of
complete sets of inequalities for the convex polytope of
non-contextual probability models, and the derived poly-
tope of expectation values for these models. Moreover,
these results are obtained at a high level of generality;
they apply not only to the familiar cases of Bell-type
scenarios, for any number of parties, but to all Kochen-
Specker configurations, and in fact to any family of sets
of compatible measurements. This generality is achieved
by working with measurement covers, following the
sheaf-theoretic approach to non-locality and contextual-
ity introduced by the first author and Adam Branden-
burger in [13].
We also obtain results for a number of special cases.
We show that a model achieves maximal violation of a
logical Bell inequality if and only if it is strongly (or maxi-
mally) contextual. We show that all Kochen-Specker con-
figurations lead to maximal violations of logical Bell in-
equalities in a state-independent fashion. We also derive
specific violations of logical Bell inequalities for models
which are possibilistically contextual, meaning that they
admit logical proofs of contextuality. Well-known exam-
ples of such models are those arising from a construction
given by one of us twenty years ago [11, 14].
Inspiration for the present work was drawn from [15],
which derives some particular cases of logical Bell in-
equalities. Developing these ideas in the general setting
provided by [13] proves to be fruitful, and indicates the
potential for a structural approach to quantum founda-
tions.
A. A Simple Observation
We begin with a simple and very general scenario.
Suppose we have propositional formulas ϕ1, . . . , ϕN .
We suppose further that we can assign a probability pi
to each ϕi.
In particular, we have in the mind the situation where
the boolean variables appearing in ϕi correspond to em-
pirically testable quantities; ϕi then expresses a condition
on the outcomes of an experiment involving these quanti-
ties. The probabilities pi are obtained from the statistics
of these experiments.
Now let P be the probability of Φ :=
∧
i ϕi. Using
elementary probability theory, we can calculate:
1− P = Prob(¬Φ) = Prob(∨i ¬ϕi) ≤
∑
i Prob(¬ϕi)
=
∑
i(1− pi) = N −
∑
i pi.
Tidying this up yields
∑
i pi ≤ N − 1 + P .
Now suppose that the formulas ϕi are jointly contra-
dictory; i.e. Φ is unsatisfiable. This implies that P = 0.
Hence we obtain the inequality
∑
i
pi ≤ N − 1.
This inequality was obtained in [15], where it was used
to derive chained Bell inequalities (as originally obtained
in [16]). It is an example of a logical Bell inequality.
In Section V we shall give a general form for logical Bell
inequalities.
B. A Curious Observation
Quantum Mechanics tells us that we can find propo-
sitions ϕi describing outcomes of certain measurements,
which not only can but have been performed. From the
observed statistics of these experiments, we have very
highly confirmed probabilities pi. These propositions are
easily seen to be jointly contradictory. Nevertheless, the
inequality
∑
i
pi ≤ N − 1
is observed to be strongly violated. In fact, the maxi-
mum violation of 1 can be achieved [17].
How can this be?
3The best resolution to this puzzle on offer is that each
formula ϕi involves a proper subset Xi of the total set
X of boolean variables which appear in the family, and
hence in the conjunction Φ. There is no global assign-
ment of probabilities to all the variables X simultane-
ously which yields the empirically observed probabili-
ties. Hence the ascription of a probability to Φ is the
invalid step. This is given general mathematical mean-
ing in terms of an obstruction to the existence of a global
section in [13, 18], extending [19].
This does seem an uncomfortably slender basis on
which to defend logical consistency, since it seems hard
to avoid the conclusion that the null event should be as-
signed probability 0.
This argument can be seen as a theory-independent
derivation of the impossibility of measuring all the vari-
ables in X simultaneously, even in principle, on pain of
a direct clash between logical consistency and empirical
evidence. We simply cannot regard the variables as each
representing a global, context-independent quantity.
C. Logical Bell and CHSH inequalities
We shall call the inequality
∑
i
pi ≤ N − 1
a logical Bell inequality. We can also derive an asso-
ciated inequality for expectations.
We shall associate truth of a formula with the value
+1, and falsity with −1. We then have the expected
value Ei of the formula ϕi given by
Ei = (+1) · pi + (−1) · (1− pi) = 2pi − 1.
From the Bell inequality, we obtain:
∑
i
Ei =
∑
i
(2pi−1) = 2
∑
i
pi−N ≤ 2(N−1)−N = N−2.
Moreover, if K is an upper bound as the expectations
range over probability assignments, −K must be a lower
bound, as we can substitute 1 − pi for pi to get the ex-
pected value −Ei. Thus this is a bound on the abso-
lute value of the expectations, so we obtain the logical
CHSH inequality:
|
∑
i
Ei| ≤ N − 2. (1)
Note that these inequalities are very general, and in-
dependent of any particular setting. We shall now show
how they apply to familiar scenarios arising from quan-
tum mechanics and the study of non-locality.
II. PROBABILISTIC MODELS OF
EXPERIMENTS
Our general setting will be the probability models com-
monly studied in quantum information and quantum
foundations [20]. In these models, a number of agents
each has the choice of one of several measurement set-
tings; and each measurement has a number of distinct
outcomes. For most of this paper, we shall focus on mea-
surements with two possible outcomes; however, we will
show how our results can be extended to measurements
with multiple outcomes in Section VIII. For each choice
of a measurement setting by each of the agents, we have
a probability distribution on the joint outcomes of the
measurements.
For example, consider the following tabulation of such
a model.
(0, 0) (1, 0) (0, 1) (1, 1)
(a, b) 1/2 0 0 1/2
(a, b′) 3/8 1/8 1/8 3/8
(a′, b) 3/8 1/8 1/8 3/8
(a′, b′) 1/8 3/8 3/8 1/8
Here we have two agents, Alice and Bob. Alice can
choose from the settings a or a′, and Bob can chooose
from b or b′. These choices correspond to the rows of
the table. The columns correspond to the joint outcomes
for a given choice of settings by Alice and Bob, the two
possible outcomes for each individual measurement being
represented by 0 and 1. The numbers along each row
specify a probability distribution on these joint outcomes.
A. The Bell Model
A standard version of Bell’s theorem uses the proba-
bility table given above. This table can be realized in
quantum mechanics, e.g. by a Bell state, written in the
Z basis as
|↑↑〉 + |↓↓〉√
2
,
subjected to spin measurements in the XY -plane of the
Bloch sphere, at a relative angle of pi/3.
Logical analysis of the Bell table
We now pick out a subset of the elements of each row
of the table, as indicated in the following table.
4(0, 0) (1, 0) (0, 1) (1, 1)
(a, b) 1/2 0 0 1/2
(a, b′) 3/8 1/8 1/8 3/8
(a′, b) 3/8 1/8 1/8 3/8
(a′, b′) 1/8 3/8 3/8 1/8
If we read 0 as true and 1 as false, the highlighted
positions in the table are represented by the following
propositions:
ϕ1 = a ∧ b ∨ ¬a ∧ ¬b = a ↔ b
ϕ2 = a ∧ b′ ∨ ¬a ∧ ¬b′ = a ↔ b′
ϕ3 = a
′ ∧ b ∨ ¬a′ ∧ ¬b = a′ ↔ b
ϕ4 = ¬a′ ∧ b′ ∨ a′ ∧ ¬b′ = a′ ⊕ b′.
The first three rows are the correlated outcomes; the
fourth is anticorrelated. These propositions are easily
seen to be contradictory. Indeed, starting with ϕ4, we
can replace a′ with b using ϕ3, b with a using ϕ1, and
a with b′ using ϕ2, to obtain b
′ ⊕ b′, which is obviously
unsatisfiable.
We see from the table that p1 = 1, pi = 6/8 for i =
2, 3, 4. Hence the violation of the Bell inequality is 1/4;
and of the CHSH inequality 1/2.
We may note that the logical pattern shown by this
jointly contradictory family of propositions underlies the
familiar CHSH correlation function.
Some notation
Later we will develop some notation for the general
case. To prepare the way we will indicate how this nota-
tion will work in the Bell model. First, in this case, we
put
X = {a, b, a′, b′}
as this is the set of boolean variables we are interested in.
Next, we consider subsets U ⊆ X , corresponding to the
different combinations of measurements we might per-
form — the measurement contexts. One such subset
is U = {a, b}. We denote the set of all such subsets by
U . Thus, in this case, we have
U = {{a, b}, {a, b′}, {a′, b}, {a′, b′}}.
A basic measurement such as a has possible outcomes 0
or 1. We shall write 2 := {0, 1} for the set of possible
outcomes. A joint outcome for a set of measurements U
can be specified by a function s : U → 2. For example,
if we perform the measurements in U = {a, b}, and a has
outcome 0 and b has outcome 1, this is described by the
function
{a 7→ 0, b 7→ 1}
which maps a to 0 and b to 1. This function corresponds
to the cell in the first row and third column of the Bell
table. The set of all such functions is denoted by 2U .
Thus for U = {a, b},
2U = {fij | i, j = 0, 1}
where fij = {a 7→ i, b 7→ j}. This corresponds to the set
of cells in the first row of the table.
A probability model such as the Bell table shown above
is given by specifying a probability distribution dU on
2U for each U ∈ U . Thus dU is a function dU : 2U →
[0, 1] such that
∑
s∈2U dU (s) = 1. These distributions
correspond to the rows of the Bell table.
The proposition ϕ1 pertains to the context U = {a, b};
note that it only uses the variables in U . We can think of
2U as the set of truth-value assignments to the boolean
variables in U , where we interpret 0 as true and 1 as false.
The set of satisfying assignments for the formula ϕ1 —
the subset of 2U for which this proposition is true — is
S(U) = {{a 7→ 0, b 7→ 0}, {a 7→ 1, b 7→ 1}}.
We have given such a proposition ϕi for each element of
U . The highlighted items in the i’th row of the table form
the set S(Ui) of satisfying assignments for ϕi, where Ui
is the corresponding measurement context.
B. A bipartite logical model
We know turn to the model introduced by one of us in
1992 [11, 14]. The original purpose of this construction
was to show a ‘logical’ proof of Bell’s theorem in the bi-
partite case, following the GHZ tripartite construction.
Reflecting this, we shall only need to consider the sup-
port table of the model to demonstrate a violation of
the inequalities.
Consider, for example, the following table, which has
a quantum realization as described in [14].
(0, 0) (1, 0) (0, 1) (1, 1)
(a, b) 1 1 1 1
(a′, b) 0 1 1 1
(a, b′) 0 1 1 1
(a′, b′) 1 1 1 0
This table has a 1 for every entry in the model with a
positive probability.
If we interpret outcome 0 as true and 1 as false, then
the following formulas all have positive probability:
a ∧ b, ¬(a ∧ b′), ¬(a′ ∧ b), a′ ∨ b′.
However, these formulas are not simultaneously satisfi-
able.
Note that the formulas ϕi for i = 2, 3, 4 describe the
full support of this model for the corresponding rows;
5hence p2 = p3 = p4 = 1. It follows that the model
achieves a violation of p1 = Prob(a ∧ b) for the Bell in-
equality, and a violation of 2p1 for the CHSH inequality.
Note that this calculation can be made purely on the
basis of the support table.
III. THE GENERAL CASE: STRUCTURE OF
SUPPORTS
We now turn to a general analysis. The setting will
be that of [13], but we shall develop what we need in a
self-contained fashion.
We shall begin by looking just at the supports of
probability models, which suffice to describe many forms
of contextual and non-local behaviour, as we have already
illustrated with the model described in Section II B. We
shall then go on to look at generalized probability models
themselves.
Notation
We shall use the notation introduced in the previous
section: we define 2 := {0, 1}, and write 2U for the set
of all functions from a set U into 2. We shall also the
following notation for function restriction. If s : X → 2
is a function, and U ⊆ X , then we write s|U : U → 2 for
the restriction of s to U . For example, ifX = {a, b, a′, b′},
U = {a, b}, and s : X → 2 is the function
{a 7→ 0, b 7→ 1, a′ 7→ 1, b′ 7→ 0}
then s|U is the function
{a 7→ 0, b 7→ 1}.
A. Structure of support tables
We fix a set of boolean variables X , and a cover U ,
i.e. a family of subsets of X such that
⋃U = X .
A probability model on a cover (X,U) is a family
{dU}U∈U , where dU is a probability distribution on 2U .
We think of the sets U ∈ U as the compatible sets
of measurements, which index the ‘rows’ of the proba-
bility table. Given such a row U , 2U is the set of possible
joint outcomes of these measurements. The distribution
dU gives the probability for each such joint outcome.
The support of the model at U ∈ U is the set S(U) ⊆
2U of those s ∈ 2U such that dU (s) > 0.
A global section for the support of the model is an
assignment
s : X → 2
such that, for all U ∈ U , s|U ∈ S(U) [21].
We can think of global sections in geometric terms,
as coherently gluing together a family of local sections
sU ∈ S(U), indexed by U ∈ U . This geometrical idea
of global section can be related to logical notions. A
formula ϕU over a set of variables U ∈ U has a set of
satisfying assignments which is a subset of 2U . Note
that, if U is finite, any subset of 2U can be defined in
this way by a propositional formula. For each U ∈ U , let
ϕU be a formula whose set of satisfying assignments is
S(U). Global sections correspond precisely to satisfying
assignments for the formula
ϕ =
∧
U∈U
ϕU .
As shown in detail in [13], the existence of global
sections provides a canonical form for non-contextual
hidden-variable theories.
We can define a probabilistic model to be possibilisti-
cally noncontextual [13] if for every element s ∈ S(U)
of its support, there is a global section s′ such that
s′|U = s. If this does not hold, the model is contex-
tual, or in particular non-local. In fact, as shown in
[13], this form of contextuality or non-locality is strictly
stronger than the usual probabilistic notions. For ex-
ample, the Bell model studied in the previous section is
non-local, but is in fact possibilistically non-contextual.
The possibilistically contextual models are those which
admit logical proofs of Bell’s theorem: ‘Bell’s theorem
without inequalities’ [10].
We can now give a completely general argument that
for any model which is contextual in this strong possi-
bilistic sense, we can obtain a violation of instances of
the generalized Bell and CHSH inequalities.
Proposition III.1 Any possibilistically contextual
model violates a logical Bell/CHSH inequality.
Proof Suppose that a model is possibilistically contex-
tual, with s ∈ S(U) such that there is no global section
for S restricting to s. We define a formula ϕs, describing
s. This formula can be written explicitly as
ϕs :=
∧
s(x)=0
x ∧
∧
s(x)=1
¬x. (2)
The only satisfying assignment for ϕs in 2
U is s.
For all U ′ ∈ U with U ′ 6= U , we define ϕU ′ to be a
formula which defines the support of the model on the
‘row’ U ′. Explicitly, we can define:
ϕU ′ :=
∨
s′∈S(U ′)
ϕs′ .
The fact that there is no global section on the support
which restricts to s says exactly that the formula ϕs ∧∧
U ′ 6=U ϕU ′ is not satisfiable. Since pU ′ = 1 for U 6= U ′ ∈U , the Bell inequality with respect to these formulas is
violated by pϕs = p(s) > 0, while violation of the CHSH
inequality is by 2p(s). 
6B. Strong Contextuality
A still stronger form of contextuality is identified in
[13]. A model is defined to be strongly contextual if
its support has no global section; equivalently, the propo-
sitional formulas defining its support are not simultane-
ously satisfiable.
It is shown in [13] that all n-partite states GHZ(n),
for n ≥ 3, are strongly contextual in this sense. It
is also shown that strong contextuality is equivalent to
the model being maximally contextual, in the sense of
having no non-trivial convex decomposition into a non-
contextual model and a no-signalling model.
We now have the following result.
Proposition III.2 A model achieves maximal violation
of a logical Bell inequality if and only if it is strongly
contextual.
Proof Suppose that the model is strongly contextual.
For each row U , we can define the formula ϕU corre-
sponding to the support of the model on that row, as in
the proof of the previous proposition. Since the proba-
bility of each ϕU is 1, we obtain the maximum violation
of 1.
For the converse, if maximal violation is achieved,
there are a family of rows U1, . . . , UN , and propositions
ϕi defining subsets S(Ui) ⊆ 2Ui , such that
∧
i ϕi is un-
satisfiable, and
∑
i pi = N . This implies that pi = 1 for
all i, and hence that S(Ui) contains the support of the
model on Ui. The unsatisfiability of
∧
i ϕi means that
there is no global section which restricts to each S(Ui),
which means a fortiori that the model is strongly con-
textual. 
Example: the GHZ state
We consider the tripartite GHZ state [10, 22], which
we write in the Z basis as
|↑↑↑〉 + |↓↓↓〉√
2
,
with X and Y measurements in each component. The
relevant part of the support table for the resulting prob-
ability model can be specified as follows:
000 001 010 011 100 101 110 111
abc 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0
ab′c′ 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1
a′bc′ 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1
a′b′c 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1
Given boolean variables x, y, z, we define
Ψxyz := ¬x⊕ ¬y ⊕ ¬z. (3)
The support for each row can be specified by the following
formulas:
ϕ1 := ¬Ψabc, ϕ2 := Ψab′c′ , ϕ3 := Ψa′bc′ , ϕ4 := Ψa′b′c.
It can be verified that these formulas are not simultane-
ously satisfiable; in fact, such a verification is what the
well-known argument by Mermin in terms of ‘instruction
sets’ [23] amounts to.
Thus the tripartite GHZ state maximally violates a
logical Bell inequality. Similar arguments apply to n-
partite GHZ states for all n > 3; see [13].
Example: the PR box
We consider the Popescu-Rohrlich box [24], which
achieves super-quantum correlations while respecting no-
signalling.
(0, 0) (0, 1) (1, 0) (1, 1)
(a, b) 1 0 0 1
(a, b′) 1 0 0 1
(a′, b) 1 0 0 1
(a′, b′) 0 1 1 0
The supports of the rows of this table are specified by
the following formulas:
a↔ b, a↔ b′, a′ ↔ b, a′ ⊕ b′
which are not simultaneously satisfiable. Thus this model
maximally violates a logical Bell inequality.
Note that these formulas are the same as those we used
for the Bell model in section IIA. In this case, however,
they cover the whole support of the model, corresponding
to the fact that the PR-box attains the algebraic maxi-
mum of the CHSH correlation function.
C. Kochen-Specker configurations
The notion of model we are considering, following [13],
is much more general than the usual ‘Bell scenarios’. For
example, any set X of quantum observables gives rise to a
cover in our sense, where the sets in the cover correspond
to the maximal compatible subsets of X . Since we are
currently restricting our attention to two-outcome mea-
surements, we shall only consider dichotomic observables.
If we fix a state, then for each maximal set of compatible
observables, i.e. each row of the table, we get a proba-
bility distribution on joint outcomes of the observables
in the family, following the usual quantum mechanical
recipe. The details are spelled out in [13].
The usual Bell case arises when the observables are
partitioned according to the sites or parties; the sets in
the cover correspond to a choice of one observable from
7each site, represented on a tensor product in the standard
fashion.
Equally, however, any Kochen-Specker configuration
gives rise to a cover in our sense [25]. Given a family of
unit vectors representing distinct rays in Rd, we consider
the corresponding dichotomic observables, whose spec-
tral resolutions project onto the ray and its orthogonal.
We shall label the outcome corresponding to the ray as
0, and the orthogonal outcome as 1.
These observables are compatible if and only if the
corresponding rays are orthogonal. Thus the maximal
compatible families correspond to the families of vectors
which determine orthonormal bases ofRd. It follows that,
for any quantum state, the only possible outcomes for
one of these maximal compatible families are those where
exactly one of the outcomes is labelled 0. Thus for any
state, the support of the probability model it gives rise
to satisfies the following formula for each set U in the
cover:
ONE(U) :=
∨
x∈U
(x ∧
∧
x′∈U\{x}
¬x′).
The essential property of Kochen-Specker configurations
is exactly that there is no global section for this family
of supports; or equivalently, that the formula∧
U∈U
ONE(U)
is unsatisfiable. It follows immediately that, given
a Kochen-Specker configuration, the probability model
generated by any quantum state with respect to the cor-
responding family of observables is strongly contextual.
This fully explicates the state-independent nature of the
Kochen-Specker theorem.
Hence we obtain the following corollary to Proposi-
tion III.2.
Proposition III.3 For any Kochen-Specker configura-
tion, and for any quantum state, the corresponding prob-
ability model maximally violates a logical Bell inequality.
Thus we have a perfectly general way of obtaining ex-
perimentally testable inequalities, with maximal viola-
tions, from any Kochen-Specker configuration.
Example: the 18-vector configuration in R4
We look at the 18-vector construction in R4 from
[26]. This uses the following measurement cover U =
{U1, . . . , U9}, where the columns Ui are the sets in the
cover.
U1 U2 U3 U4 U5 U6 U7 U8 U9
A A H H B I P P Q
B E I K E K Q R R
C F C G M N D F M
D G J L N O J L O
The standard argument that this is a Kochen-Specker
configuration [13, 26] amounts to verifying that the for-
mula
9∧
i=1
ONE(Ui)
is unsatisfiable. Thus for any quantum state, the result-
ing probability model will maximally violate a logical Bell
inequality.
Example: the Peres-Mermin Square
We look at an important example, the Peres-Mermin
square [27, 28], which can be realized in quantum me-
chanics using two-qubit observables.
The structure of the square is as follows:
A B C
D E F
G H I
The compatible families of measurements are the rows
and columns of this table. The key property differs from
the usual Kochen-Specker situation in that we don’t ask
for exactly one 1 at each maximal context. Instead, we
ask that each ‘row context’ has an odd number of 1’s
whereas each ‘column context’ has an even number of
1’s. Hence the support table is the following.
000 001 010 011 100 101 110 111
ABC 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1
DEF 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1
GHI 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1
ADG 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0
BEH 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0
CFI 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0
Note that the first three lines correspond to the row con-
texts and the remaining three to the column contexts
from the square.
The following formulas characterize the supports for
each line of the table:
ϕ1 := ΨABC , ϕ2 := ΨDEF , ϕ3 := ΨGHI
ϕ4 := ¬ΨADG, ϕ5 := ¬ΨBEH , ϕ6 := ¬ΨCFI .
Here we use Ψxyz as defined in (3).
It can be verified that these formulas are not simulta-
neously satisfiable. Thus the Peres-Mermin square max-
imally violates a logical Bell inequality.
8IV. GENERAL PROBABILISTIC MODELS
Suppose we are given a cover U on a set X . A general
probability model over U assigns a probability distribu-
tion dU on the set 2
U for each U ∈ U [29].
Each global assignment t ∈ 2X induces a deterministic
probability model δt:
δtU (s) =


1, t|U = s
0 otherwise.
We have the following result from [13, Theorem 8.1]:
Theorem IV.1 A probability model {dU} is non-
contextual if and only if it can be written as a convex
combination
∑
j∈J µjδ
tj where tj ∈ 2X for each j ∈ J .
This means that for each U ∈ U ,
dU =
∑
j
µjδ
tj
U .
In fact, this gives a canonical form for such models,
subsuming the usual notions of local or non-contextual
hidden-variable models.
V. THE GENERAL FORM OF LOGICAL BELL
INEQUALITIES
It will be useful to establish some notation for express-
ing logical Bell inequalities. Suppose we are given a cover
U on a set X . As illustrated in the examples we have
looked at previously, we will regard X as a set of boolean
variables. We shall consider expressions of the form
N∑
i=1
kiϕi
where for each i, ki is a non-negative integer, and ϕi is a
formulas whose variables are drawn from Ui ∈ U .
We think of such expressions asmultisets of formulas,
where ϕi appears with multiplicity ki. A sub-multiset
of
∑
i∈I kiϕi is an expression of the form
∑
i∈I k
′
iϕi,
where for each i, 0 ≤ k′i ≤ ki. The cardinality of∑
i∈I kiϕi is
∑
i∈I ki. We say that
∑
i∈I kiϕi is K-
consistent if for every sub-multiset of cardinality > K,
the underlying set of formulas with positive support has
no satisfying assignment.
Given a positive integer K, we consider the expression
N∑
i=1
kip(ϕi) ≤ K. (4)
If we are given a probability model {dU}U∈U , we can
evaluate the formal expression p(ϕi) as pi := dUi(Si),
where Si is the set of satisfying assignments in 2
Ui for ϕi
— i.e. the event defined by ϕi.
The model satisfies the expression (4) if
N∑
i=1
kipi ≤ K.
Proposition V.1 The inequality (4) is satisfied by
all non-contextual models if and only if the multiset∑
i∈I kiϕi is K-consistent.
Proof By Theorem IV.1, any non-contextual model
can be written as a convex combination
∑
j µjδ
tj , where
tj ∈ 2X .
It suffices to verify (4) for the deterministic models δt,
since if for each j we have
∑
i kipi,j ≤ K, where pi,j =
δ
tj
Ui
(Si), then:
∑
i
ki(
∑
j
µjpi,j) =
∑
j
µj(
∑
i
kipi,j) ≤
∑
j
µjK = K.
Now if the multiset
∑
i∈I kiϕi is K-consistent, any t ∈
2X , viewed as a boolean assignment on X , can satisfy a
sub-multiset of cardinality at most K, and hence δt will
satisfy the inequality (4).
Conversely, if t satisfies K+1 formulas in the multiset,
each corresponding term in (4) will be assigned probabil-
ity 1 in δt, and hence we will have
∑
i kipi ≥ K + 1. 
Note that the form of logical inequality which we have
considered previously is a special case, where we have
a set of N formulas which is (N−1)-consistent. Allow-
ing for the more general notion of K-consistency leads
to sharper inequalities, which are needed to obtain com-
pleteness.
It is important to note that there is no requirement
for the sets Ui to be distinct. Thus different formulas
occurring in the multiset may define overlapping subsets
of the same row.
We define the general notion of logical Bell inequality
over a cover U to be given by expressions of the form (4),
where the multiset of formulas isK-consistent. Note that
this class of inequalities is defined solely in terms of the
cover U , and a purely logical condition on the formulas.
Thus we may indeed regard this as a logical class; the
interesting point is that we can obtain quantitative in-
formation about contextuality from conditions which are
derived in a purely logical fashion.
VI. COMPLETENESS OF LOGICAL BELL
INEQUALITIES
We shall now show that logical Bell inequalities com-
pletely characterize contextuality.
We begin by recalling the definition of the incidence
matrix from [13]. Given a cover U on a setX , we define a
matrix M whose rows are indexed by pairs (U, s), where
U ∈ U , and s ∈ 2U ; and whose columns are indexed
by global assignments t ∈ 2X . The matrix entries are
9defined by:
M[(U, s), t] =


1, t|U = s
0 otherwise
Note that the columnM[ , t] of the matrix corresponds to
the deterministic model δt. We can regard a probabilistic
model {dU}U∈U as a real vector v in the row space ofM,
where v[U, s] = dU (s).
Proposition VI.1 The non-contextuality of the proba-
bilistic model represented by the vector v is equivalent to
the existence of a non-negative solution x ≥ 0 for the
linear system
Mx = v.
Proof For each U ∈ U , the sub-vector vU of v forms
a probability distribution on 2U , and hence sums to 1.
Since the restriction map 2X → 2U is surjective, and
Mx = v implies (Mx)U = vU , it follows that the entries
of x sum to 1. Thus x defines a probability distribu-
tion µ on 2X . Moreover, the equation (Mx)U = vU is
equivalent to
dU =
∑
t∈2X
µ(t)δtU .
Thus a solution x exists if and only if the model can be
written as a convex combination as in Theorem IV.1. 
Thus the set N of non-contextual probability models is
the convex hull of the set of deterministic models δt, t ∈
2X . By the fundamental properties of convex polytopes
[30–32], N is equivalently specified by a finite set of linear
inequalities.
To state this more explicitly, we firstly recall the well-
known Fourier-Motzkin elimination procedure [30–32].
Proposition VI.2 (Fourier-Motzkin elimination)
If we are given a finite system I(x,y) of linear inequal-
ities in the variables x, y, we can effectively obtain a
finite system J(y) of inequalities in the variables y,
such that v satisfies J if and only if for some w, (w,v)
satisfies I. Moreover, J is constructed from I using only
the field operations, so if I is rational, so is J .
The size of J is, in the worst case, doubly exponential
in the size of I. Nevertheless, Fourier-Motzkin elimina-
tion is widely used in computer-assisted verification and
polyhedral computation [33, 34].
In our case, we begin with the ‘symbolic’ system
Mx = y, x ≥ 0, 1 · x = 1
in variables x, y. This can be written as
a1,jx1 + · · ·+ aN,jxN − yj ≥ 0, j = 1, . . . , D
−a1,jx1 + · · ·+−aN,jxN + yj ≥ 0, j = 1, . . . , D
xi ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , N
x1 + · · ·+ xN ≥ 1
−x1 + · · ·+−xN ≥ −1
where the coefficients ai,j come from the incidence matrix
M, and
N := 2|X|, D :=
∑
U∈U
2|U|
are the dimensions of M. Note that, since the system is
symbolic, we have to add the constraint that x sums to
1 explicitly.
Writing this system as I(x,y), by Proposition VI.1, we
have
N = {v | ∃w. I(w,v)}.
By Proposition VI.2, we can eliminate the variables x
from this system, producing a system J of inequalities in
the variables y, such that v satisfies J if and only if for
some w, (w,v) satisfies I. Thus v is in N if and only if
v satisfies J .
Thus we obtain the following result.
Proposition VI.3 There is a finite set of rational vec-
tors r1, . . . , rp, and rational numbers r1, . . . , rp, such
that, for all probability models v:
v ∈ N ⇐⇒ ∀i = 1, . . . , p. ri · v ≤ ri.
A. Completeness of logical Bell inequalities
Suppose we are given a cover U . A rational inequal-
ity over U is given by a rational vector r and a rational
number r. A probability model v satisfies this inequality
if r · v ≤ r. Two inequalities are equivalent if they are
satisfied by the same probability models.
Theorem VI.4 A rational inequality is satisfied by all
non-contextual models over U if and only if it is equiva-
lent to a logical Bell inequality.
Proof A rational inequality determines an equivalent
integer inequality given by an integer vector k and an
integer M , obtained by clearing denominators.
Suppose that we are given an integer vector k indexed
by (U, s), where U ∈ U and s ∈ 2U . For each (U, s), we
define non-negative integers kUs , and formulas θ
U
s in the
variables U :
kUs = |k[U, s]|
θUs =


ϕs, k[U, s] ≥ 0
¬ϕs, k[U, s] < 0.
Here we use ϕs as defined in (2).
Now suppose we are given a probability model v. For
each (U, s), we define pUs to be the probability assigned
by v to the subset of 2U defined by θUs .
We claim that:
k · v =
∑
U,s
kUs p
U
s −
∑
k[U,s]<0
kUs . (5)
To see this, for each (U, s) we compare k[U, s]v[U, s] with
kUs p
U
s :
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• If k[U, s] ≥ 0, then k[U, s]v[U, s] = kUs pUs .
• If k[U, s] < 0, we have:
k[U, s]v[U, s] = kUs ((1 − p(ϕs))− 1) = kUs (pUs − 1).
Collecting terms, we obtain (5).
We now consider the expression
∑
U,s
kUs p(θ
U
s ) ≤ K, (6)
where K =M +
∑
k[U,s]<0 k
U
s .
By (5), a probability model v will satisfy this inequal-
ity if and only if k · v ≤ M . Thus this inequality is
equivalent to the rational inequality we began with.
Now suppose that this inequality is satisfied by all
non-contextual models. Since the coefficients kUs in (6)
are non-negative, K must be non-negative. By Propo-
sition V.1, the multiset of formulas
∑
U,s k
U
s θ
U
s is K-
consistent, and thus (6) is a logical Bell inequality.
Thus every rational inequality satisfied by all non-
contextual models is equivalent to a logical Bell in-
equality. From Proposition V.1, we also have the con-
verse: every logical Bell inequality is satisfied by all non-
contextual models. 
Combining Proposition VI.3 and Theorem VI.4, we ob-
tain the following completeness result.
Theorem VI.5 The polytope of non-contextual proba-
bility models over any cover U is determined by a finite
set of logical Bell inequalities. Moreover, these inequal-
ities can be obtained effectively from U . Thus a proba-
bilistic model over any cover is contextual if and only if
it violates one of finitely many logical Bell inequalities.
Proof By Proposition VI.3, given U we can effectively
obtain a finite set of rational inequalities defining the
non-contextual polytope. Using the construction given in
the proof of Theorem VI.4, we can effectively transform
these rational inequalities into equivalent logical Bell in-
equalities. 
VII. LOGICAL DESCRIPTION OF
CORRELATION INEQUALITIES
We shall now show that correlation inequalities can
also be analyzed logically; in fact, they form a special
case of the logical inequalities we have already described.
A probability model v determines a vector ηv =
(EU )U∈U of expectation values. Here
EU := (+1) · p(ψU ) + (−1) · p(¬ψU ),
where ψU is a formula whose satisfying assignments are
those with an even number of 1 outcomes. Thus we can
define
ψU := ¬
⊕
x∈U
¬x. (7)
The set of expectation vectors of non-contextual mod-
els is the image under a linear map of the convex polytope
of non-contextual probability models, and hence forms a
convex polytope E , with vertices given by the vectors ηt,
t ∈ 2X .
Clearly, any probability model v whose expectation
vector ηv is not in E must be contextual. However, the
converse is not the case. We shall return to this point in
Section VIIB. Nevertheless, the correlation inequalities
have received a great deal of attention in the literature
on non-locality, and it is clearly of considerable interest
to give a complete characterization.
We shall now give a logical characterization of a com-
plete set of inequalities for the polytope E on an arbitrary
cover U .
Theorem VII.1 For any probability model v such that
ηv 6∈ E, there is a logical Bell inequality
∑
U∈U
kUp(θU ) ≤ K (8)
which is violated by v, where for each U , θU is either ψU
or ¬ψU .
Proof By similar reasoning to that used in the proof of
Theorem VI.5, there is an integer vector k and an integer
M such that k · ηw ≤ M for all non-contextual models
w, and k · ηv > M .
For each U , and any probability model w, we consider
two cases:
• If k[U ] = kU is positive, then we can write
k[U ]ηw[U ] = kU (2p(ψU )− 1).
• If k[U ] = −kU is negative, we can write
k[U ]ηw[U ] = −kU (2p(ψU )− 1) = kU (1− 2p(ψU ))
= kU (2(1− p(ψU ))− 1) = kU (2p(¬ψU )− 1).
Rearranging terms, we have
k · ηw =
∑
U∈U
2kUp(θU )− P
where each θU is either ψU or ¬ψU , and P is a positive
integer. Hence the inequality k ·ηw ≤M is equivalent to
w satisfying the inequality
∑
U∈U
2kUp(θU ) ≤ K (9)
where K = M + P . By Proposition V.1, the fact that
all non-contextual models w satisfy k · ηw ≤ M implies
that (9) is a logical Bell inequality. Since k · ηv > M , v
violates this inequality. 
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Note that, for any vector η ∈ E , η = ηw for some non-
contextual model w, and w satisfies all the logical Bell
inequalities.
It is also possible to reverse the procedure described in
Theorem VII.1, to obtain a complete set of inequalities
directly applicable to expectation vectors.
Given a logical Bell inequality of the form
∑
U∈U
2kUp(θU ) ≤ K
where for each U , θU is either ψU or ¬ψU , we can form
the inequality
∑
U∈U
lUEU ≤ M
where M = K −∑U∈U kU , and
lU =


kU , θU = ψU
−kU , θU = ¬ψU .
We call this class of inequalities on expectation vectors
the logical correlation inequalities.
As an immediate consequence of Theorem VII.1, we
have.
Theorem VII.2 An expectation vector η is in E if and
only if it satisfies all the logical correlation inequalities.
A. Example
We consider the following correlation inequality for the
(3, 2, 2) case given by Werner and Wolf in [35]:
1/4
8∑
i=1
Ei − E8 ≤ 1 (A2).
Here Ei, for i = 1, . . . , 8, is the expectation value for the
combination of measurements whose value, written as a
binary string, is i− 1.
If we write this more explicitly, and clear the denomi-
nator of the scaling factor 1/4, we obtain:
7∑
i=1
Ei − 3E8 ≤ 4.
If we now convert this to the form (4), following the pro-
cedure given in the proof of Theorem VII.1, we obtain
the following inequality:
7∑
i=1
p(ψi) + 3p(¬ψ8) ≤ 7.
We can see that the multiset
7∑
i=1
1ψi + 3(¬ψ8)
is 7-consistent. In fact, ¬ψ8, together with any 5 of the
formulas ψ1, . . . , ψ7, is inconsistent.
B. Example
There are a number of extremal vertices of the no-
signalling polytope in the (3, 2, 2) case, as listed in [36],
which satisfy all the correlation inequalities from [35] [37].
We shall examine one of these in detail. This is the
vertex numbered 4 in the listing in [36].
We shall label the measurements as a, a′ for site 1;
b, b′ for site 2; and c, c′ for site 3. The support of the
model for each measurement combination m can be rep-
resented by a formula ϕm; since the distribution on each
row is uniform on the support, this completely specifies
the model.
We recall the definition of ψU from (7). The formulas
for the support of the model are defined as follows:
ϕabc = ϕabc′ = ψab; ϕab′c′ = ϕa′b′c′ = ψb′c′
ϕa′bc = ϕa′b′c = ψa′c; ϕab′c = ψab′c; ϕa′bc′ = ¬ψa′bc′ .
Combining these, we obtain the following multiset of for-
mulas:
2ψab + 2ψb′c′ + 2ψa′c + ψab′c + ¬ψa′bc′ .
Since ψab is equivalent to a ↔ b, in the presence of
the first three formulas ψab′c is equivalent to ψbc′c, and
¬ψa′bc′ is equivalent to ¬ψcbc′ . Since ψU is independent
of the order in which the elements of U are listed, we ob-
tain a contradiction. In fact, this multiset of formulas is
7-consistent, so the model achieves a maximal violation
of the logical Bell inequality
2p(ψab)+2p(ψb′c′)+2p(ψa′c)+p(ψab′c)+p(¬ψa′bc′) ≤ 7.
This yields a concrete example of a no-signalling model
which satisfies all the correlation inequalities, while max-
imally violating the canonical logical Bell inequality aris-
ing from its support.
VIII. MULTIPLE OUTCOMES
Thus far we have focussed exclusively on dichotomic
measurements, which are particularly convenient for con-
necting to logic. However, the general format of measure-
ment covers easily allows the results to be extended to
measurements with multiple outcomes.
For example, we consider the case of (n, k, 2p) Bell sce-
narios: n sites, k measurements per site, and 2p outcomes
per measurement. This corresponds to the following sit-
uation in our setting. We have a set X with nkp elements
{mij,l}, where i = 1, . . . , n, j = 1, . . . , k, and l = 1, . . . , p.
We write
X ij := {mij,l | l = 1, . . . , p}, Xi :=
k⋃
j=1
X ij .
The cover U comprises all those subsets U of X such
that, for all i = 1, . . . , n, for some j, U ∩Xi = X ij . The
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idea is that Xi is the set of measurements which can be
performed at site i. There are k choices available at each
site between sets X ij of p dichotomic measurements each.
Because these measurements are compatible, they can be
performed together, resulting in a measurement with 2p
possible outcomes. An overall choice of measurements
consists of selecting one such compatible family for each
site.
All our results apply directly to this situation, which
is itself a very special case of the general notion of cover.
Thus from Theorem VII.2, we have an explicit descrip-
tion of a complete set of correlation inequalities charac-
terizing the (n, k, 2p) Bell scenarios.
IX. FINAL REMARKS
For further directions, it would be of particular interest
to see how much of the present approach could be lifted
to the quantum set, and the Tsirelson inequality [38].
As regards related work, the form of expressions we
have used for the logical inequalities correspond to basic
weight formulas in the logic for reasoning about probabil-
ities studied in [39], following [40], which was motivated
by applications in Artifical Intelligence.
The correlation polytopes of Pitowsky [41], which have
a lineage going back to Boole’s ‘conditions of possible ex-
perience’ [42], should also be mentioned. Although this
line of thought is certainly in a kindred spirit, Boole’s
conditions are arithmetical in nature; while the central
theme of the present paper is that complete sets of Bell
inequalities can be defined in terms of purely logical con-
sistency conditions.
The notion of K-consistency is closely related to the
well-known MAX-SAT problem in computational com-
plexity [43]. This asks for the maximum number of
clauses in a given set which are satisfiable.
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